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THE DEVIL AND JIMMY BYRNES
by Frederick L. Schuman
N October 15, 1947, Harper and Brothers published James
F. Byrnes' Speaking Frankly, a book which has aroused

0

widespread comment at home and abroad. The scope of the
comment is amply justified. This is the most important and
revealing book on U.S. foreign policy to appear since the war.
It is a record of experience and a confession of faith by the
chief 'architect of that policy. It is also the most baffling, incredible and terrifying document to come from the pen of a responsible American official in many years.

Man- and Nemesis

I

Let no one suppose that this is merely- another outbreak of

- symptoms in the current epidemic of anti-Soviet hysteria and
D.T.'s. Mr. Byrnes is a man of reason who all his life has sought
peace through compromise. He is mild, modest, almost mouse;
like-albeit not without Irish pride and temper, as shown by
his demand for Henry Wallace's dismissal from the Cabinet after
his public criticism of Mr. Byrnes' policies. This shrewd South
Carolinian was, successively, altaf-boy (before he turned Episcopalian), local politician, Congressman, lawyer, Senator, Supreme Court Justice, Director. of Economic Stabilization, Director
of War Mobilization, and Secretary of State (July, 1945-January,
1947). Few men have served their country more ably or been
more honored by it. Here is no Bullitt, Earle, Luce or Burnham.
Mr. Byrnes, I am wholly convhced, is a citizen of good will, a
genuine Christian in the best sense, a splendid American, a
Roosevelt "New Dealer" (though he may not-now like the term),
and a mover and thinker who is devoutly concerned, to a degree
rare among public servants, with the welfare of his countrymen
and of all the world's people.

t

It is precisely ihese attributes which give to his work and
words an appalling quality of nightmarish &sanity which, if
. uncured, can leave no hope whatever for the survival OFcivilized
mankind. The reader who knows no more of the diplomatic
record than what is told in the book or is vaguely remembered
from headlines will scarcely detect the element of madness here.
- Yet here it i~-~ojsonous,patliologicil and, pathetic-to such a
(I~greeas to justify comple~elythe gloomiest pmgnoses of a
Spengler or a .Toynbee regaiding demovatic statesmanship in
decadent civilizations. By some subtle magic, Jimmy Bymesswho, unlike Faust, has no comprehension of what he-has done
-has .sold h& mind and soul t o the dark god variously known
.
as Beelzebub, ,Satan or Mephistopheles.

Split Penonali+y.

'

'
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In,its general tone, however, the book sounds deceptively sane.
Byrnes' contacts with Soviet leaders began at the flalta Conferene of February, 1945 to which Roosevelt insisted he come. ~ h e p . .
continued through the Potsdam Conference, the deadlocked,
September meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the sue.
ce~sfulAsession
of the Three Foreign Ministers in Moscow in
December, the U.N. Assembly in London in January, ig46,-the
Paris meetings of Foreign Ministers in spring and summer, the , ,'
Paris Peace Conference of.~ u l ~ - ~ c t o bI e946,
r , and the New York
Countil session of December where fivi peace treaties were'finally
approved. He warmly endorses Stain's view that "it is our duty to see that our relations in peace-time are as strong as they have
- .
been in war." (p. 44) Stalin he describes as "a very likeabletpe*- .
- son" @. -45)-and Molotov as able, shrewd, gracious, persistent
and, ekasperating.
Byrnes recounts instance after instance of Soviet concegsions
and corn~roomises.He is flatly opp6sqd to ~ i e r i c a nintervention
in China. "The besi course is -to krithdraw," to retain our ':reser- . voir of goodwill" and remain '6n the side of progress in Asia."
-(p. 229) While he neyer admits that he himself
ever wrong,
he grants that "many issues admit of honest differences of opini&n.'We
..
. cannot-and must not claim ingallibiliiy for our policy
.decisions." (p. 3 12)
I
The, problem of.explaining Mr. Byrnes arises from numerous
other passages where endorsement is given to almost all the
cliches about ,the Soviet Union whieh-are the stc&in-trade .of
4
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Russophobes and Red-baiters of government; business, press
and radio peith purposes of their own to serve. Mr. Byrnes' pur:
poses, one would like. t o believe, are -of a different order. But
his sales technique is suspiciously similar. In mealy-m~~thed
.self-righteousness, he paint+ a portrait of American diplqmacy
. dedicated consistently to-peace, democracy, freedom and rectitude ,
and constantly obstructed in its quest for virtue by Soviet wickedness: Russian "expansionism" is alarming and elearly sinful, in
contrast to American expariiionism which is at once noble and .
non-existent. .Russian e~pansionism,it -Ferns, is old. Karl Marx
is quoted against it. Bolshevik expansionism is' mbre dangerous
than Tsarist expansionism - because it ,has an . "aggressive ideology." "Greece is apparently their first objective." Italy may be
next. "I do not'doubt that their ultimate goal is to dominate, in
one way or another, all of Europe." (p. 295) Therefore "firmness" is needed the Truman ~oct'rineis :'correct,"' although
-somewhat "n~rvous" (p. 302), the so-calbd Marshall Plan is
excellent, Hungary must be rescued, etc. Here again, between
the lines of Mrt,.Byrnes' unemotional prose, the Red Monster is
reaching out menacingly' to gobble up all. of God's children,
-and all-good men and true must rally to halt its fiendish onrush .
and save Christianity, Capitalism .and Civilizati.on from annihilation.
The present writer has repeatedly written and said that these
views are not only utterly nonsensical but that their propaga- iion is dangerous to the point of criminality. I propose to continue speaking and writing to the same effect so lolig as freedom
of speech survives. The question as to why Americans believe
these falsehoods is easily answered: they have been assured of
their truth: b; most of their ne;spapers - and periodicah; by
- almost all ~~mmentators
still broadcasting, by many of their '
clergymen, and by virtually all ,of-their public leaders, including
Mr. Byrnes; The question as to why (or whether) Mr. Byrnes
believes them to be true is more compl& But it merits explora- .
tion. Fortuhtely, such exploration is possible because Mr.
Byrnes has a conscience and a feeling for accuracy and honesty
doei not confine himself, as do most'others of this school, to
- mere e r n a t i o n and defamation. His "'evidence" is nowhere
stated ip one place, but is scattered through the b k . It deserves evaluation.
'

~e

Double Sfandard
'Mr. Byrnes is rightly troubled by "violations of pledges." The
Yalta accords,- for example, were "useful" because they are "the
basis on which we have shown the world that Russian actions
in Eastern Europe have been in violation of. ~ussia'spledged
word." -(p. 34) The Potsdam agreements "did make the confer:
ence a success but the violation of these agreements has turned
success into failure." (p. 87) As for the Moscow accords of
December, 1945, had they been "as favorable to the Soviet Union
as some critics have charged, the Soviets would not have violated
them. And the fact that ever since we have been protesting
against these violatiins indicates that they were in the best interests of the liberated States." (p. 239) Leaving aside this curious non-sequitur (one of many in the book), what is the basis of
the contention, now accepted as a truism by the government and
many of the people of the USA, that the USSR has violated its
pledges?
Its essence is simply that when Washington's interpretation
of an agreement differs from Moscow's interpretation, the former
is obviously right and the latter obviously wrong. If America '
and Britain define "democracy," "free elections" or "Fascists"
in one way and the Soviet U,nion defines them in another, the
same rule holds. In sober fact when an agreement calls for "joint
assistance" and refers to "joint responsibilities" to be discharged
"when in the opinion of the three governments, conditions make
such action necessary," all logic and law prescribe that the action
in question is to be taken when the three governfnents are
agreed and that none can properly be taken when they are not
agreed. Not so, however, with Mr. Byrnes and the State ~ e ~ a r t ment. Under the Truman dispensation such pledges mean that
when there is no agreement Moscow must do what Washington
and London demand-and if it refuses, it is guilty. of a breach of
Eaith.
Is it conceivable that the USA or Britain has ever violated
pledges? Hardly. ~rmknessobliges Mr. Byrnes to note that the
U.S. agreed to the admission of Argentina to the U.N. at San
Francisco in violation (said.Stalin) of Roosevelt's statement at
Yalta. He quotes Stalin on the Polish question as saying: "Even
'though the Russians are simple people, the West often makes
the mistake of regardihg them as fools." (p. 62) At San Francisco,
moreover, Stettinius asserted that the ' USSR was "eligible" to

'.
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receive a territory as a U.N: Trusteeship. But when Molotov
later suggested that the USSR might receive a territory as a
U.N. Trusteeship, this, Mr. Byrnes implies, was dear evidence
of perfidy and sinful ambition. On September 15, 1944, Roosevelt and churchill at Quebec "approved the Morgenthau plan"
for .Germany (p. 184); but the subsequent repudiation not only
of its details but of its purposes in Washington and London,
somehow not a repudiation of the pledged word. Mr.' Byrnes
solemnly agreed in Mosc~w,December 28, 1945, to "non-interference in the internal affairs of China" and to "withdrawal-of
~ d v i e tand American forces from China at the earliest practical
moment." There has been no Soviet intervention in China. Soviet
troops have long since been withdrawn. The U.S. has intervened
to the tuneL-ofbillions of dollars. American troops are still.there.
By a logic never explained, this also adds up, mirabile dictu, not
to an American but to a Soviet breach of faith!

.

.

Mendacity by Deletion
This perqistent dse of tivo scales in which to weigh American
and Soviet policies is matched by a numtjer of amazing omissions
in Mr. Byrnes' record-none of them, I believe, a p r o d ~ c iof
deliberate deception, but all of them a result of that familiar
process whereby the mind, when worried by fears of guilt, sup' presses into the unconscious all memory of
the sources of
anxiety' There is, for example, .no mention of Henry
Wallace's
w.
, . arguments against Byrnes' policies and no effort to answer them.
The present tragic impasse in American-Soviet relations had its
chief original source in Byrnes' statement of August -18,1945,
setonded by Bevin's speech of August so, wherein Washington
and London, in the name of "democracy," opened the diplomatic and propaganda campaign, which has continued ever
since, to oust Soviet influence from Eastern Europe and the
Balkans. A highlight of this campaign, and a direct precursor
of the Tr-an
~octrine,was Churchill's."iron curtain" speech
in Fulton, Mo., March 5, 1946. Not even a one-page outline of
post-war diplomacy would be worth the paper 't is written on
without mention of these statements of purpose. But, incredibly
in a book of goo pages, Mr. Byrnes does not mention any of them
#even once, much less discuss their import o r impact. Neither
does he indicate how and why the French and Chinese Foreign
k , consistently voted against
Ministers in Loncton ( ~ e ~ ~ e r n1b945)

.
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.~olotov-and-with
~evi@
and Bymes. He presentg (p. ' ~ 0 7Arner)
f
,3
i c h p n g n i t ~ o nof ,the ~rovisional Governments of Austria
- , -+
(Odtober x?d, 1945) and Hungary (November 2) as gestures of
friehdship toward MOSCOW,
with no. mention of the fact that
./ -7
, .
-"
Vienna,_early in ~ c t i b e r had.
,
yielded to ~ n ~ l o - ~ m e r i cpresitn
sure i~
rejecting a Soviet proposal for. a *joint oil company and
2
fl
,
that the antiSoviet Small Landowners' Party won the Budapkst
.
'7
' muhicipal elections of October 7.
. .
. Perhaps the most glaring omission of all 'in these pages is
?
;,
the ghastly coqt of the war to the Soviet Union. Nowhere is this
cm&al determinant of Soviet policy more than hinted at. Mr.
3
~ ~ r m % , s p e a kfor
s ' a nation which grew wealthy o n the war to - - ,
I:
one which w& fim-hilly deva~atedand impoverished.and
, ?
thirty lives fm. every Americab life sacrificed to defeat the foe.
Yet Mr. Bymei can say that Soviet proposals f i r reparitions
. from currmt German production are "inexcusable" and that
.
.*
"we (sic) should realize that, modern war being what it is, it is
short-sighted and futile for aiy country to seek approximate
; ,compensation for losses it has sustain~d.".(p.,86) He is also silent :
on the refusal of'his go*ernment-to grant any post-war loans or
'
&edits to the' USSR while pouring out billions for Britain, ~ r a i c e ,Italy, any and. Japan. With qonrmendable candor
. -.
but unbelievable pettiness, - he does note, however (p$ 1
- .- "i(:
, that when he saw Czichoslovak ,delegates at Paris a p p l a ~ d .
Vyshinsky's criticism of American "dollar diplomacy," he f'irn,mm@ati;lyc&Ied~i~tructions
to the State Department to stop
-. I
he-^ extension of credits to ~zechoslo~kia."He also told Jan
~ a s k y khow "shocked" he ivas by' the' fact that Prague had,
proposed to transfer a portion of the credit to Romania at a . 'i
.+.#prdfit.Yet on the next page be admits, as a "slight mitigation" . - - J
of:~z&hoslovaksin, that a .U.S. Treasury ~ e ~ a r t m ebfficial
nt
in
' :,
Pkgne-'had been ask& about the Romanian transaction .and
- had made no obiection. The credi! was never renewed. .
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Misrepresentation is i s effective as omission in gilding the lily

of de~ukion.On.page 38 Byrnes attribites to R ~ e l att Yalta
a kqtemmt: *at Sumner Wellesmade a "q&taLe" in telling the
Laiin -American Republics merely- to break reratioas 'with ~ e r fna'ny - rather than declare war. 'fSJever," k o t e Mr. WeUes in reply, October 21, "during the years I sewed linder the pr&i- -

.
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dint did the Department of State ever 'tell' any other American
Republic what action it should take. Never did President Roosevelt suggest such a step. It was only after Mr. Byrnes was appointed Secretary of State that 'telling' our American neighbors
became a feature of our policy." Mr. Bvnes also tells of his
"shock" (p. 255) at Stalin's speech of February g, 1946, "in
which he announced the new Five-Year Plan with its emphasis
1 on rearmament instead of the production of consumer gbods."
Anyone who cares to reread the speech will recognize that any
such description of it is a falsehood, Again: "As I said in
Charleston on November 16, 1945, the suggestion that we
might use the atomic bomb 'as a diplomatic or military threat
against any nation is not only untrue in fact but is a wholly
unwarranted reflection upon the American government and
people.'
-@. 275) Comment is needless.
Yet again:/the USSR concluded its neutrality and non-aggression pact of 1939 with Hitler (who flagrantly viol?ted jt 22months later) with no conviction that it would escape ultimate
attack by the Nazi Reich. "Thus, it seems clear that the Soviet
- Gavernme~tconcluded the pact .while fully intending-to violate
it." (p. 286) Evidence: none, sin&! there is none. Arguments: if
I conclude a contract with my neighbor who, I fear, may break
it, this proves that I intend to break it! Finally, Mr. Byrneq
makes much (pp. 288 f.) of the contention, allegedly derived
from the Nuremberg documents, that Hitler decided to attack
the- USSR after Molotov had proposed in Berlin, November
12-13, ig40, a new regime for the Straits and a Soviet-Bulgarian
mutual aid' pact. '!This was the decisive moment." In fact the
Nuremberg documents show beyond- question that the N h i
decision to invade the USSR was reached in August, 1940.Jodl
and his staff officers were well advanced in planning the invasion
when Molotov came to Berlin. These documents are public
'knowledge. Mr. Byrnes is a former Secretary of State. There.?
fore
"

-

..

Program
On the broader theme Mr. Byrnes is concerned with arguing
three general propositions: (1) the deteriorition of American- .
Soviet relations began before Roosevelt died and is therefore
not attributable to President Truman or Mr. Byrnes; (2) there
was not (or maybe there was-M& Byrnes is here confused) an*

'

accord between the Western Powers a d the Soviet Union on
"spheres of influence" in Eastern Europe; (3) Germany must be
restored as a bulwark against the Red Menace.
The first of these propositions i s demonstrably false, on Mr.
Byrnesyown evidence. The second lies at the very heart of the
problem of American-Soviet relations since V-J day. The third
is the Truman-Byrnes-M-arshallprescription for World War 111.

The Firmness of

-

F o D o R o

Aften Yalta President Roosevelt was disturbed, says Byrnes,
by Soviet policy in Romania and Poland and by Stalin's belief
that Anglo-American parleys for the surrender of Kesselring's
army in Italy involved t e r m permitting the transfer of German
divisions to the Eastern Front 'and suggesting -a "soft peace" for
the Reich. Roosevelt expressed resentment at the "vile misrepre
sentations" of Stalin's informers. Stalin made a conciliatbry
. reply. The incident was closed on April 11, 1945. F,D.R. invariably resolved such frictions satisfactorily because, unlike his
successor, he wanted a settlement for peace and not occasions
for conflict. On April 12, notes Mr. Byrnes, the President, an
hour before he died, sent a message to Churchill, urging that the
"Soviet problem" be minimized as much as possible "because
these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day
and most of them straighten out. . . . We must be firm, however,
and our course thus far is correct." (p. 59)
. Mr. Byrnes disproves his own point because he does not understand the course. Franklin D. Roosevelt's course was to treat the
Soviet Union as an equal, to minimize frictions, and to adjust
differences by discussion and compromise-all of which was
diametrically opposite to the course of President Truman, who
conferred with Leahy, Marshall, Patterson and Forrestal before
meeting,Molotov on his way to San Francisco. "It was not," says
Byrnes cryptically (p. 61), "a very harmonious .meeting and
. ended rather abruptly." T o the work, thus meanly begun, of
wrecking the wartime coalition, Byrnes added his labors in
August of the year of victory, and intermittently thereafter.

Broken Bargain
- On 'the moot question of whether or not Washington, London
and Moscow reached agreement, before or after Yalta, on
"spheres of influence," Mr. Byrnes, all unwittingly, has performed

,

a real service (for those with eyes to see) in settling the issue.
There was in fact an agreement that Eastern Europe and the
Balkans north of Greece should be regarded as a Soviet security
zone, while Western Europe, Italy and the Mediterranean, including Greece, were recognized by Moscow as part of the AngloAmerican security zone, It is precisely the violation and repudiation of this understanding by Byrnes and Bevin which has
driven the Big Three off the road of unity and toward the valley
of disaster. In his rambling and confused kedtal of controversies
over Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, Mr. Byrnes obscures realities. Yet, by happy accident, he has since let the cat out ,of the
bag. On page 53 he wrote that Churchill and Eden in Moscow
in October, 1944, reached an "informal understanding that, if
the British found it necessai) to take military action in Greece,
the Soviets would not interfere. In return, the British would
recognize the right of the Soviets to take the lead in mainraining
order in Romania." When an anonymous "British ,Foreign
Office spokesman" on October 16, 1947, declared that this state- '
ment was "inco~rect," Mr. Byrnes was moved by a desire for
self-justification to make a further revelation which demolishes
the whole basis of his policy:
Evidently (he asserted, New York Times, October 18,
-1947) the Foreign Office spokesman is not informed, My
statement was based on a message from Prime Minister
Churchill to President Roosevelt, dated March 8, 1945, in
the first paragraph of which; after deploring Soviet actions
in Romania, Mr. Churchill said: "We have been hampered
in our protests against these developments by \the fact that,
in order to have the freedom to save Greece, Eden and I at
. Moscow in October recognized that Russia should have a
largely preponderant voice in Romania and Bulgaria while
we took the lead in Greece. Stalin adhered very strictly to
this understanding during the thirty days' fighting against
the Communists and Elas' in the city of Athens, in spite
of the fact that all this was most - disagreeable to him and
those around him."

The question is thus answered. At no time did Moscow protest against or challenge' the British action in Greece in i944-45,
shameful as that action was, as long as the Kremlin believed that
* London an8 Washington were reconciled to preponderant Soviet
influence in the Balkans north of Greece. Yalta and Potsdam
seemed to Moscow, and quite plausibly, to confirm this under11

ktanding. Byrnes and Bevin repudiated - it. in August, 1945. -Washington and London have been seeking ever since (and
thus far quite- in vain) to challenge and destroy Soviet influence
in the area they originally acknowledged to be part of the Soviet
security zone. Moscow has retaliated-and will continue to do so,
since it regards the unity of Slavic Europe under ~ & c o v i t e
leadership as an indispensable condition \of Soviet safety which
in no way threatens British- or American interests-as Roosevelt
and, originally, Churchill conceded without questibn. The sub-'
sequent Byines-Bevin-Truman-Marshallprogram for ousting the
USSR from ~ a s t e hEurope and the Balkans and reconstituting
these communitiks as an anti-Soviet bulwark is a direct and ' ~ n
attack u - g n all ,the objectives for which the Soviet Union fought
and won &s war against the &is.

-

Deutschland O ber Alles
;$$p2

Since it is now clear that this challenge 'has failed, that the
Truman Doctrine is bankrupt, and that no effective counterweights-to Soviet power can be established in-Poland, Czechoslovakia or the Balkans, the little men in Washington have
turned eagerly to an obvious alternative: the restoration of
Germany (and prospectively Japan and China) as an anti-soviet
~i
bastion.
,,
This is the meaning of the ~ a r s h d Plan.
l
In support%
: ing it, Mr.. Byrnes arrives at his formula for World War 111. He
?'k
$2: notes '(pp. 26, 29, 86) that the USSR is committed to a German
.;%t
:g settlement whereby if will share >n international control of the
I:\ Ruhr and will be granted, as Roosevelt~agreed at Yalta (at least
:
\):;as. a basis for discussion), the equivalent of lo billion dollars in
- .-.
.?-.reparations from Germany, out of a proposed total of 20 billions.
$& This, says Mr. Byrnes, is intolerable. ,The USSR should abandon
,%both demands, agree to the reunification of the Reich, and accept instead a 25-year or a 40-year veaty with the USA,
&continued German disarmament and mdtual aid against future
'--.German aggression. .If Moscow doubts the efficacy of this ar?A&
~s~Grangement
and insists on its original proposals, it is guilty of
'5- delay, obstructionism, expansionism and wicked designs to pro- !:<:&ote -&aos.
"My patience was euhausted," writes the Secretary of State (p. 175) when Molotov insisted on lo billions in reparations. '
AtLStuttgart (Sepiember 6, 1946) Byrnes appealed to .German
nationalism by arguing for German unity and challenging the
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new Polish-German frontier. Bevin and Churchill sent congratu.
latiom. Byrnes (pp. 192-3) held a secret parley in Paris with
Churchill and Smuts to celebrate the new line on Germany.
"The Stuttgart speech,'' notes Mr. Byrnes correctly (p. ig4),
"continues to represent American policy toward Germany.''
Since Moscow will hot agree and insists, sinfully, on Fourpower control of the Ruhr and lo billions in reparation, what
is to be done? Mr. Byrnes has a clear answer. "Wisddm and
justice will prevent the United States from ever acceding to the
soviet demands either on the Ruhr or on reparations." Internationalization and socialization in the Reich -are both unthinkable. America must therefore act- (read this citrefully; it is not
a misprint!)-to see that "the control of Gqman industries should
be turned back to the owners" (p. 195, my italics)-i.e., the
private monopolists and carteleers who put Hitler in power and .
.furnished the arsenal of the German war machine in World
Wars I and I1 and, prospectitely, 111, despite Mr. Byrnes' enthusiasm for "disarmament." Asaerica should demand a peace .
conferepce on Germany early in 1948. If the USSR refus& to
.participate or to accept the knglo-~mkricanterms, a separate
' German peace must be made with a German Government in
the combined Western zones, providing for the evacuation of all
German territory by foreign troops. If Moscow refuses to agree,
,then America must ask the U.N. Security Council to eject Soviet
troops frem Eastern Germany, since their continued presence
"would constitute a threat to the peace of the world."

*

War For Peace
America has "obligations" and "pledges" (apparently to
Germany) that must be fulfilled.'"We must be- clear . . . that
we are willing to adopt these measures of last resort if, for
the peace of the world, we are forced to do so. . .J hope, believe,
.and I pray that the leaders of the Soviet Union will never force ,
us to this course of last resort. -But they must learn what Hitler
learned-that the world is not going to permit one nation -to
veto peace on earth (p. 203). . . . We must use our best efforts
to develop better (atomic) bombs and more of them (p. ~ j j-..
Today there is no military strength in Europe to restrain the
Russians. Only the power of the United Nations can do. it. The '
United ati ions must make known its determination to act to
protect the threasened State. And the United States must , make
.

.
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known its determination to use all of its power to support the
action of the United Nations." (p. 297)
For all Americans still in their right minds, no comment is
called for on these propositions. They are, as the London Tinies
put it on October 16,-"little better than a simple recipe forwar."
Mr. Byrnes, observed the London News Chronicle, "has talked
deplorable and dangerous nonsense." Wrote the London Daily
Mirror: "Mr. Byrnes . . . is so frank as openly to advocate war
with Russia. Is this wickedness, idiocy or a mixture of both?"
Mr. Byrnes on October 22 expressed pained surprise at the
notion that he had proposed using force to drive the Russians
out of Germany, for he did not use the word- "force" (only
"measures of last resort"!) and his refeience to atomic bqmbs
"appeared in another chapter of the book." ~ r n i t r iManuilsky.
on October 18 said ~ ~ r h is
k s!'asking, for war against the Soviet
Union." Pravda on the next day called his book "a direct appeal
for war with the Soviet Union." Vyshinsky on October 22 concurred in the view that Byrnei' proposals were "a recipe for war"
,against the USSR.

-

Final Judgment
8

-

-

These British and Soviet evaluations of. Byrnes' book, and of
the current American policy which Mr. Byrnes first formulated,
are entirely correct. Never under any threat will the Soviet
leaders and people abandon Eastern Germany and Slavic Europe
to AngIo-Arderican control and to inevitable future use as new
bases of attack against the Soviet Union. The children of Mother
Russia have thrice in a single generation heroically faced death
against the assaults of the Kaiser's Reich, the Allied and American interventionists, and the Fascist Powers. T o the last man,
woman, and child, they will all face death again before they
yield . to such demands as Byrries proposes. Since Mr. Byrnes,
who is-mot stupid, must be presumed to. know this; no other
conclusion can be drawn but-that he sincerely believes that the
.values he lives by and the interests he serves can best be promoted by an anti-Soviet war. Such a war, he must suppose, would
be brief, cheap and merciful, with atomic bombs dispelling the
Red Menace for all time. Suih a war, of course, must be "defensive." Hence the formula of U.S. support of U.N. actioa to.
rescue Prussia from the Russians. Perhaps Mr. Byrnes should be
reminded that every act of aggression by the late Nazi leaders

,
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in exactly this sense. At Nuremberg, wrote

H e q L. Stimson (Foreign Affairs, January, 1947). kas ''affirmed
t& eimple principle of peace-that the man who makes or
, - ,pjlans aggressive war is a criminal. . . ."
Is Jimmy Byrnes-able, affable, well-meaning and earnest-no
better than the mass murderers who died on the gallows? No
American today could accept any such monstrous view. But acts
.of men are judged less by their motives than-by their fruits.
If Mr. Bymes' advice is taken, the most hideous of Nazi atrocities
will pale 'before the infernal spectacle. of scores of millions of
human Feings perishing in agony by fireand poison. No courts
will .remain. however, to try the culprits,,since courts are products
of civilization. All civilization as we know it will crumble into
..radio-active dust and rubble if Mr. Byrnes has his way. The war
he dreams of cantlot be won by either side. Russians don't surrender. Russians also have atomic physicists and big industry.
This war means the end of our culture. It was Mr. Byrnes himself
who once said: "There must be one world for all of us, or there
will be no world for any of us."
Mr. Byrnes is not a vicious man. Neither were Keitel, Frick,
Papen, Jodl or Neurath. Mr. Byrnes wants peace. Mr. Byrnes
wants Soviet surrender without war. he special skill of Mr.
Bymes' private devil (who knows full well what the road to
damnatiqn is paved with, and who also administers to the needs
- of many other public figures) is that he leaves his victim a perfectly moral and patriotic Christian, who is merely mistaken in
his political and military judgments. he offense is so small as
to seem inconsequemial. But its consequences in the atomic age
.may well be the murder of most of ,the human race. .
Is America still capable of a return to sanity? The answer,
perhaps mercifully, is still unclear. Only this is clear: if the
American people lack the wit and will to rec'apture the vision of
~ r a n k l i nD. Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie, and to give new
q Wallace, Glen
life to such hopes as are voiced by ~ e g A.
Taylor, Claude Pepper apd Wayne Marse, they will have madea covenant with hell and a pact with death. The measure of
their ignorance, incapacity and deviltry is the fact that saintly
Jimmy Byrnes is now the best advocate of Satan. The measure
of their wisdom, resolve and righteousness remains to be taken.
Who:then shall be his brother's keeper3
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